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ABSTRACT—While America's criminal justice system is deeply rooted in 
the ideal of a popular morality play, it has long since drifted into becoming 
a bureaucratic plea bargaining machine. We cannot (and would not want 
to) return to the Colonial Era. Even so, there is much more we can do to 
reclaim our heritage and incorporate popular participation within our 
lawyer-run system. That requires pushing back against the relentless 
pressures toward efficiency and maximizing quantity, to ensure that 
criminal justice treats each criminal with justice, as a human and not just a 
number. The criminal justice system must narrow its ambitions and scope, 
counteract professionals’ tunnel vision, make punishment more productive, 
and make criminal procedure more transparent and participatory. This 
Essay ends by gesturing towards how the United States might start to tackle 
these kinds of reforms.
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INTRODUCTION 
The roots of America’s criminal justice system are deeply populist and 
moral. In the colonies, the whole community participated in doing justice. 
Criminal justice was an essential part of democratic self-government: it 
taught lessons, expressed outrage, healed social and psychic wounds, and 
empowered victims, defendants, jurors, and the public. In other words, it 
was a communal morality play.1 
Over the course of four centuries, professionals have displaced this 
democratic morality play with a bureaucratic plea bargaining machine. 
Lawyers speak for and silence parties, judges have developed rules too 
technical for laymen to navigate or understand, plea bargains bypass juries, 
and prisons hide punishment. Plea bargaining is a hidden and often skewed 
process, in which non-merits factors such as wealth, bail, risk aversion, and 
attorney skill loom large.2 The public may see plea bargaining as 
cheapening and hiding justice.3 
America cannot return to the Colonial Era; the plea bargaining 
assembly line is here to stay. Even so, we can do much more to reclaim our 
heritage and incorporate popular participation even within our lawyer-run 
system. 
The most fundamental problem with bureaucratic criminal justice is 
that it has lost sight of why and how We the People should punish. 
Bureaucratization breeds an intense concern for efficiency, measured 
quantitatively as the number of arrests, charges, and convictions.4 That is a 
recipe for “mass incarceration,” not moral judgment or public safety. The 
1 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012). 
2 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1153–58 (2011). 
3 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 51, 196 n.49. 
4 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1139 (2008) (“The traditional 
conception of prosecutors as sentence-maximizers . . . recognizes that efficiency . . . is the chief 
justification for plea bargaining. Prosecutors craft pleas to ensure the greatest number of convictions, 
with each conviction garnering the highest possible sentence.” (footnote omitted)). 
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citizens whom the bureaucracy is supposed to serve, by contrast, care about 
more qualitative goals too: not only maximizing deterrence and 
incapacitation, but also tailoring punishment to individual retributive desert 
and exploring prospects for reform. And laymen care more than criminal 
justice professionals about process values, such as having their day in court 
and being treated fairly and respectfully.5 So the bureaucratic reality 
neglects the public’s ideals. Criminal justice could do much more to treat 
each criminal with justice, as a human and not just a number. 
I. THE MORAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In the legal academy, there is a marked disconnect between 
scholarship on substantive criminal law and scholarship on criminal 
procedure. While criminal law often begins with reflecting on retribution 
and rehabilitation, criminal procedure all but ignores such moral and 
philosophical issues. And neither field steps back to first principles, to ask 
when and how a democracy should punish as a matter of political theory, 
with the consent of the governed. 
Police and prosecutors are agents of the American people. They 
punish in the name of We the People: criminal cases are captioned People 
of the State of X v. David Defendant, not The King or Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. David Defendant. A crime is a public wrong against the 
entire community affected by the crime. And while the victim has a stake 
in the crime, the particular police officer, prosecutor, or judge does not and 
is merely an agent of the people. The agent should faithfully serve the 
principals’ interests and deepest values, but often does not. 
In colonial America, however, there was no principal–agent 
disconnect because there were few if any agents. The people not only saw 
justice done but did justice themselves. Victims typically prosecuted their 
own cases pro se, telling their own stories. Defendants likewise defended 
themselves pro se, challenging victims’ accounts by offering their own, or 
pleading for mercy. Trials were thus shouting matches, telling dueling 
stories in simple terms. Judges refereed these shouting matches, offered 
their own views, and recommended mercy in appropriate cases. In most 
colonies, laymen sat in judgment both on juries and in the town square 
during public punishment.6 
5 See generally Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for 
“Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3, 20–27 (1974) (discussing and cataloguing criminal justice 
“process values”). 
6 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 3–6, 9–11; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 19, 246 n.1 (2003) (noting that Middlesex County, 
Massachusetts did not receive its first county prosecutor until 1807); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
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The jury trial and ensuing punishment were a morality play: a form of 
educational social theater.7 Trial and punishment were didactic, teaching 
and reinforcing citizens’ understandings of right and wrong.8 They were 
expressive, condemning the guilty and vindicating victims or innocent 
defendants. They were cathartic, purging the criminal’s debt to society and 
to his victims. And they were restorative, paving the way for remorse, 
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation.9  
Sanctions were very public but very temporary.10 American criminal 
justice was in many ways less bloody than the English system; the death 
penalty and disfiguring punishments were infrequently imposed and even 
less often carried out.11 Fines and shaming were probably most common, as 
well as restitution, though whipping and other corporal punishments were 
used too.12 Once wrongdoers had paid their debts to society and victims, 
they were forgiven and welcomed back—there was no permanent 
underclass of ex-cons.13 
Lay involvement and control were crucial to colonial criminal 
justice’s efficacy. Crimes were defined by the common law, not a technical 
penal code, and were mala in se. They accorded with widely shared 
intuitions about justice and punishment, giving potential violators ample 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 38 (1989) (“During the first 
half of the nineteenth century, private prosecution dominated criminal justice in Philadelphia. . . . 
[M]ost criminal prosecutions were initiated by private citizens.”); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE
ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 11–16 (2003) (describing eighteenth-century English
criminal trials, which were procedurally similar to early colonial criminal trials).
7 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1993) (“[The 
trial] was a public, open affirmation of the rules and their enforcement; a kind of divine social 
theater.”). 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 37, 39–40. 
10 See id. at 37–41. 
11 See id. at 41 (“By the standards of the times, and by English standards, the colonies were far 
from bloody.”); id. at 41–44 (noting that it was extremely rare to hang colonial convicts for burglary, 
robbery, or theft, and that each year, on average, the colony of Pennsylvania convicted fewer than two 
defendants of capital crimes and executed only about one). See generally STUART BANNER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 6–8, 65–68 (2002) (giving a brief history of the death penalty and 
its evolution in the colonies and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and noting that the 
northern colonies were more sparing in authorizing the death penalty for violent and property crimes 
and in practice rarely executed convicts for morals offenses). 
12 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 37–41 (discussing common methods of punishing criminals in 
the colonies). 
13 WILLIAM M. OFFUTT, JR., OF “GOOD LAWS” AND “GOOD MEN”: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE
DELAWARE VALLEY, 1680–1710, at 186–91 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence of criminal-offender 
reintegration in the colonies in the Delaware Valley (now Pennsylvania and New Jersey)); Eli Faber, 
Puritan Criminals: The Economic, Social, and Intellectual Background to Crime in Seventeenth-
Century Massachusetts, in 11 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 83, 137–44 (Donald Fleming ed., 
1978) (describing criminal-offender reintegration in Puritan Massachusetts). 
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notice. Those intuitions, rooted in Christian faith, emphasized that each of 
us is sinful, fallen; there but for the grace of God go we. All classes, not 
just the poor, fell afoul of the law. But Christian optimism tempered the 
colonists’ pessimism. That same faith saw in each defendant the image and 
likeness of God, seeking to condemn the wrong while loving and 
welcoming back the prodigal son. Thus, the system respected every 
participant’s intrinsic moral worth and dignity.14 
Trials were likewise commonsense matters of hearing each side’s 
story and assigning not only factual and legal but also moral blame. That 
meant they were simultaneously backward- and forward-looking, 
adjudicating the past with an eye toward the future. Juries often selected 
among multiple possible gradations of offenses, tailoring their convictions 
to the particular defendant’s culpability and equities. Judges and juries 
could thus show mercy or recommend clemency in proportion to each 
defendant’s fault, dangerousness, and amends.15 
The entire criminal process was transparent and participatory. 
Transparency and participation kept the substance of criminal law, 
enforcement, and punishment in accord with popular morality. 
Procedurally, transparency and participation empowered victims, 
defendants, and citizens. Everyone had his day in court, told his story, and 
saw justice done by doing it himself. Aggrieved or innocent parties were 
vindicated, and guilty parties condemned, in the public eye. Participation 
empowered victims and citizens, counteracting many victims’ feelings of 
powerlessness. 
The roots of American criminal justice embody the thought of Emile 
Durkheim and Alexis de Tocqueville. In his Division of Labor in Society, 
Durkheim wrote that reforming defendants and deterring imitators are only 
incidental benefits of criminal justice; its core function is to reinforce 
society’s solidarity.16 When a criminal transgresses the criminal law, 
society must denounce the wrong and punish the wrongdoer to reinforce its 
basic moral norms.17 In Durkheim’s words, “[w]ithout this necessary act of 
satisfaction[,] what is called the moral consciousness cannot be 
14 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 2–3, 11–12. The biblical reference is to the Parable of the Prodigal Son, 
found at Luke 15:11–32. In that parable, the prodigal son stands ready to admit his profligacy and to say 
that he deserves to be treated as a servant, not a son. But as soon as the father sees his son from a great 
distance, he has compassion, runs to kiss him, and rejoices over his return to life. 
15 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 7–9. 
16 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62–63 (W. D. Halls trans., The Free 
Press 1984) (1893). 
17 Id. at 63. 
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preserved. . . . [Punishment] serves to heal the wounds inflicted upon the 
collective sentiments . . . .”18 
Durkheim’s social solidarity helped to sustain the democratic self-
government praised by Tocqueville.19 The colonists’ commonsensical 
system was a living, functioning part of democratic self-government. 
Citizens took turns serving on grand and petit juries, seeing first-hand 
justice in practice and so educating themselves and their neighbors. They 
applied the law to the facts and equities of particular cases, balancing 
freedom and security, justice and mercy. There were few if any technical 
rules of procedure or evidence to obscure or obstruct public understanding 
and moral judgment.20 And there were plenty of lay checks upon official 
overreaching, ranging from tort liability for overzealous searches to grand 
jury presentments for official malfeasance.21  
To be fair, the social conditions of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries were far more conducive to running criminal justice as 
a morality play. The colonies were small, close-knit communities—“tight 
little islands” in Lawrence Friedman’s phrase.22 They were very religiously 
and ethnically homogeneous, and much less diverse in race, education, and 
wealth.23 (Where there were slaves and other minorities, they suffered 
second-class justice or worse.) People were much less mobile. State and 
government apparatus were much less developed, and there was far less 
professionalization.24 There were no law schools or even indigenous law 
books in the English colonies, and there were no professional police 
forces.25 And the lack of professional governmental apparatus carried 
substantial costs. For instance, night watchmen, constables, and other 
untrained volunteers and conscripts were hardly a match for dangerous 
professional criminals.26 
18 Id. 
19 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 442–50 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. 
Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1835) (discussing the role of the jury in self-governance). 
20 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
21 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786–87 
(1994) (tort liability); Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 
1333, 1354–56 (1994) (grand jury presentments). 
22 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 17. 
23 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 14. Conversely, these generalizations were probably less true of 
larger, more urban, more heterogeneous colonies such as New York. 
24 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 3, 14. 
25 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 2 (1975) (discussing the absence of indigenous 
law books in the colonies); FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 27–29, 67 (discussing the absence of 
professional police forces). 
26 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 28. 
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Nevertheless, the colonists had something we lack today: a 
participatory, democratic justice system, attuned to local needs and moral 
intuitions. The next Part explores how professionalization came at the cost 
of democracy, as efficiency supplanted morality. 
II. PROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
After the American Revolution, lawyers steadily displaced lay 
participation in criminal justice. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
public prosecutors displaced victims. Then, defense lawyers increasingly 
represented defendants, speaking for and silencing their clients. Prosecutors 
and defenders were of course lawyers, agents of the public or defendants. 
That meant they lacked a personal stake in convictions and sentences, let 
alone in each side’s having its day in court.27 
As agents, they did have interests in clearing their own dockets, 
minimizing their workloads, and avoiding the expense and possible 
embarrassment of losing at trial. Judges share most of these interests as 
well. So prosecutors, defense lawyers, and soon judges began to cooperate 
to trade less severe punishments for certain convictions. This was the rise 
of plea bargaining, which manipulated charges, convictions, and sentences 
outside the public’s view.28 
From a Weberian bureaucratic perspective, plea bargaining makes 
perfect sense. Repeat players soon learn the value of recurring cases, 
developing a market with going rates and standardized terms. Risk-averse 
parties can cap their exposure and avoid worst-case outcomes as well as 
expense and delay.29 The judge and lawyers clear their dockets and move 
the business, following the bureaucratic imperative to process cases quickly 
and cheaply. By saving the cost and drama of adversarial combat, plea 
bargaining makes each of the criminal justice insiders better off.30 
Moreover, if one defines criminal justice’s aims narrowly as just 
efficient case processing, plea bargaining seems to make the system work 
27 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 16. 
28 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 62–90, 121–24, 129–36 (discussing prosecutors’ use of dismissals, 
early probation, and later sentence recommendations as plea bargaining tools to lighten prosecutors’ 
and judges’ busy dockets, particularly once the Industrial Revolution clogged courts with tort suits). 
29 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 32; MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 110–14 (1978) (explaining pressures on prosecutors 
to engage in plea bargaining). 
30 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 32–33; see HEUMANN, supra note 29, at 66, 144–48, 156–57 (1978); 
Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1379–82 
(2017). 
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better too.31 The system as a whole maximizes speed and quantity, 
optimizing general deterrence (as well as incapacitation).32 In an 
overwhelmed world of too much crime, the plea bargaining assembly line 
eventually seems to be the best that we can do. 
When one removes these blinders, however, efficiency looks very 
costly. First, professionalization entails very substantial agency costs. 
Prosecutors and defense lawyers have substantial interests in reducing their 
own workloads and minimizing the chance of embarrassing defeats at trial. 
None of these actors feels his client’s pain. That can rein in excessive 
vengefulness, but it can also soften the vigorous adversarial combat that is 
supposed to elicit the truth. 
Second, the punishment assembly line loses sight of the purpose of 
punishment. The overriding objective is to do what it takes to get a 
conviction and get the case off the prosecutor’s plate. That means that 
prosecutors make offers defendants cannot refuse, using whatever leverage 
they have to induce guilty pleas. These punishment threats and 
inducements rarely reflect retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or reform. 
They are simply instrumental tools to induce pleas. And their instrumental 
value comes precisely in bypassing the morality play for which many 
victims and citizens thirst.33 
Punishment markets are amoral, divorced from punishment principles 
and only indirectly concerned with factual guilt. Non-merits factors such as 
defense counsel overwork, underfunding, and pretrial detention often drive 
bargains. Psychological biases and heuristics like overoptimism, 
discounting, framing, anchoring, risk aversion, and loss aversion skew 
punishments too.34 
Third, bureaucratic efficiency is at odds with checking governmental 
power. The Framers were deeply suspicious of state actors abusing criminal 
punishment. They built in democratic checks and balances such as grand 
and petit juries, sacrificing efficiency for public accountability.35 But plea 
bargaining’s efficiency depends upon bypassing or subverting these checks 
and balances. The result is concentrated power, empowering prosecutors to 
31 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992) 
(“Plea bargains are compromises. Autonomy and efficiency support them.”). 
32 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 
296–300 (1983) (discussing plea bargaining as a means of maximizing general deterrence). 
33 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 39–40 (describing how the process values of outsiders to the criminal 
justice system differ from those of insiders). 
34 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2530, 2496–519 (2004). 
35 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182–85 
(1991). 
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exercise much hidden discretion with little accountability. Criminal justice 
professionals are thus insulated from meaningful oversight.36 
Fourth, insulation from the public breeds suspicion. Criminal justice 
depends on its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. When it comes to seem 
unconcerned with justice, criminal justice loses its claim upon citizens’ 
voluntary cooperation. They are less likely to comply voluntarily with the 
law when no one is looking, and less willing to report crimes or otherwise 
cooperate with police and prosecutors.37 This problem is akin to the Stop 
Snitching Movement and widespread protests against police shootings: 
large segments of the public no longer feel that law enforcement is on their 
side.38 Moreover, poor people are disproportionately arrested and charged, 
and they suffer most from inadequate funding of indigent defense counsel.39 
These disparities exacerbate poor people’s disadvantage and distrust of the 
system. 
Fifth, in exalting quantity über alles, our system degrades the quality 
of criminal justice. The system seems callous, inhumane, deaf to the 
emotional and psychological needs of victims, defendants, and the public. 
Victims feel victimized again, disempowered, shut out, and silenced. 
People feel treated as fungible widgets to be hurried along the plea 
bargaining assembly line, not humans who have stories to tell and need a 
sympathetic ear. 
Finally, speeding defendants along to prison treats them as less than 
human. Punishment is now little more than warehousing outcasts in internal 
exile. There is no serious effort to reform or rehabilitate them. Instead, their 
prolonged isolation and criminal records brand them as a permanent caste 
of ex-cons. Though America once embraced wrongdoers as errant brethren 
36 BIBAS, supra note 1, at 52. 
37 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 949–51 (2006). 
38 Patrice Morris & Vivian Pacheco, Stop Snitching Campaign, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND 
CRIME 773, 773 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. Gabbidon eds., 2009); see Bibas, supra note 37, at 
951 (“Perhaps because of these factors, nearly three-quarters of Americans lack much confidence and 
trust in the criminal justice system.” (citing Lydia Saad, Military Again Tops “Confidence in 
Institutions” List, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERV. (June 1, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
16555/military-again-tops-confidence-institutions-list.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RD8-JKTA])). 
39 See KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE
ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 11 (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR2E-Q2BS] (reporting 
that each of the fifteen states with the largest prison populations “had a practice of arresting people 
because they were unable to pay fines, fees, debts or because they did not attend hearings about these 
debts”); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN 
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7–14 (2004), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM87-8P5K]. 
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to be reclaimed, we now treat them as rabid dogs to be caged or as garbage 
to be thrown away. 
One would think that the philosophical aims of criminal punishment 
would drive the procedures of criminal justice. But simplistic metrics of 
efficiency have taken on a life of their own. In substance, we seek to 
maximize the crudest measures of general deterrence and incapacitation by 
promoting the greatest imprisonment for the greatest number. Retribution 
filters into the system only in a truncated form, looking at the severity of 
crimes and criminal records but neglecting intent, motive, and character. 
There are pockets of treatment courts for juveniles and the lowest-level 
nonviolent crimes, particularly for drug-addicted defendants. But 
otherwise, reform and rehabilitation are all but absent from serious 
consideration. 
In recent years, activists and policymakers have finally paid some 
attention to inequality of punishment, a consideration that is absent from 
the punishment assembly line. Even so, when the system tries to promote 
equality at all, in practice it focuses on mathematical equality of outcomes, 
not moral equality sensitive to each defendant’s intent, background, reform, 
and other justifications for punishment.40 Concern for victims and 
procedural fairness are almost entirely eclipsed by this equality calculus. 
The reign of quantity is a sign that the punishment machine has abdicated 
popular moral judgment.41 
III. THE AMBITIONS AND LIMITS OF REFORMS
Confronted with the scale of the problem, one is sorely tempted to 
“abandon every hope” upon entering here.42 Dynamiting the plea 
bargaining edifice is futile. American criminal justice processes more than 
a million felony cases per year and more than ten million misdemeanors, 
not to mention many millions of traffic violations and tickets.43 Crime is a 
40 See, e.g., Michelle S. Phelps & Devah Pager, Inequality and Punishment: A Turning Point for 
Mass Incarceration?, 663 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 185, 196–97 (2016) (studying correlations 
between states’ income inequalities and imprisonment rates, and between states’ racial composition and 
imprisonment rates). 
41 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 
102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1459–62, 1469–74 (2016). 
42 DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY VOLUME I: INFERNO 89 (Mark Musa trans., Penguin 
Books 1984) (Canto III, l. 9). 
43 SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL 
TABLES 1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/77C9-63PY] (“In 
2006, state courts sentenced an estimated 1,132,290 persons for a felony conviction.”); ROBERT C. 
BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
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perennial worry, and the mediating social institutions that restrained and 
handled much of it have frayed, forcing increasing reliance on what used to 
be the system of last resort. 
Moreover, trial procedures have hypertrophied, making it too 
cumbersome to try more than a fraction of cases. Much of this 
overproceduralization has been constitutionalized, and much more is 
entrenched in technical rules of evidence and procedure. Old habits die 
hard, and it is difficult to imagine trying every case or declining to 
prosecute 80% or more of crimes. 
Caution is warranted, but despair is not. Reining in agency costs and 
refocusing criminal justice on its moral ends and procedural values remain 
imperative, even if these goals are ambitious and only partly achievable. 
First, police and prosecutors have vast power that is now essentially 
unchecked, thanks to the withering of grand juries, petit juries, and judicial 
sentencing discretion. That unchecked discretion contrasts sharply with the 
administrative state and its extensive apparatus of standards, notice and 
comment, government in the sunshine requirements, and judicial review.44 
In addition, American criminal justice runs largely on autopilot. The 
goals it pursues reflexively diverge widely from the public’s intuitive sense 
of justice. Paul Robinson and his coauthors’ scholarship has impressively 
demonstrated how many common liability and punishment rules are greatly 
at odds with survey respondents’ sense of deserved punishment.45 The same 
is true of our plea and punishment procedures, which deny victims, 
defendants, and members of the public their say and day in court. 
Criminal justice is a subject about which the public has great concern. 
Given its deeply moral content, the public is also unwilling to defer to 
technical experts. Repeated efforts to insulate criminal justice from popular 
input and opinion have backfired, as Rachel Barkow and others have 
shown.46 Squelched and deprived of other outlets, eruptions of populist 
COURTS 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808 
[https://perma.cc/A383-K2FC] (estimating that American courts handle roughly 10 million 
misdemeanor cases per year). 
44 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); see Rachel E. 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1020–31, 1041–50 (2006) 
(explaining the lack of administrative, judicial, and political oversight of police and prosecutors; 
contrasting this with ample oversight present in other administrative spheres; and discussing the plea 
bargaining consequences of such broad prosecutorial discretion). 
45 See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1961–78 (2010). 
46 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 798–800 (2005) 
(“[A]gencies responsible for regulating criminal justice issues are under enormous political pressure, 
regardless of their design. . . . [I]t is largely up to legislatures to determine how much influence 
sentencing commissions will have, and features designed to promote independence are of little 
consequence in this context.”). 
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outrage only make things worse. Voters turn for instance to tools of direct 
democracy such as initiatives and referenda, adopting bumper-sticker 
slogans such as three-strikes laws and mandatory minima. Yet prosecutors 
and other insiders routinely subvert these laws, turning them into more plea 
bargaining chips and so further fueling popular outrage and learned 
helplessness.47 
The ultimate goal here is to refocus from quantity to quality. That 
means first and foremost taking seriously the principle of parsimony. 
Criminal stigma and punishment should as a rule be reserved for the most 
serious mala in se. We need more triage mechanisms, to better sift out and 
divert smaller and less blameworthy wrongs. Most wrongs should be 
resolved civilly, administratively, or by arbitration, mediation, or diversion 
accompanied by restitution and possible treatment.  
Declination should become the norm for matters that are smaller, less 
blameworthy, amenable to noncriminal resolution, or not readily provable 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That would require more investigation up front 
to vet the strength of the evidence and likely defenses, instead of trusting in 
the ability to bargain away weaknesses later.48 One important benefit of 
ferreting out and declining to prosecute weak cases is that it will 
disproportionately benefit innocent defendants, clearing their names earlier 
and preventing wrongful convictions. 
This legal change requires an accompanying cultural change to the 
American expectation that “there oughta be a law” or “there oughta be a 
prosecution.” Many other societies use many other ways to mediate 
conflicts and ensure restitution and apologies. The growing restorative 
justice movement exemplifies these lessons.49 America’s litigious culture 
could learn a lot from them.  
Narrowing criminal justice’s ambitions will husband its stigma and its 
resources, conserving its credibility. It will also allow for more thorough 
and considerate procedures, better ensuring factual, legal, and moral 
accuracy. Slowing cases down will allow more care, more caution, and 
more thorough deliberation about guilt, blame, and the need to condemn 
and punish. Judges should once again judge, not just rubber stamp. 
47 Bibas, supra note 37, at 939–45. 
48 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 
49, 61–64 (2002) (discussing “hard screening” policies as an alternative to later charge-related 
negotiations, and describing the prosecutorial screening practices that Orleans Parish District Attorney 
Harry Connick put in place to reduce plea bargaining). 
49 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 94–101, 222–26 & nn.26–37 (collecting sources); Erik Luna, 
Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1. 
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Finally, improving the quality of criminal justice means caring not 
only about why and how much we punish but also how we get there. 
Procedural justice means treating victims, defendants, and citizens as 
stakeholders, not just nuisances or informational resources. It requires 
soliciting their views and knowledge and listening to them fairly and 
respectfully. Talking and listening in turn require time: it is hard for a 
defense lawyer to build rapport and trust with a client if he has only five 
minutes to speak with him in the holding cells outside the courtroom and 
instantly presents him with a plea offer as a fait accompli. “Meet ‘em and 
plead ‘em” lawyering must end. So must the most coercive punishment 
threats, such as using the death penalty as a plea bargaining chip. Criminal 
justice needs to tend to humans humanely—as people, not widgets or 
statistics. 
IV. RETURNING SOME POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Any problem this gigantic and longstanding resists pat solutions in the 
last few pages of a law review essay. That difficulty warrants caution, but 
not despair. Some reforms are easier and less costly, especially in the short 
term, while others are longer-term ambitions. This Part sketches out a 
rough ladder of types of reform, from those that work within a 
fundamentally professionalized system to those that transform it by 
bringing in the public. 
The first cluster of reforms seeks to change professionals’ perspective. 
Prosecutors, police, and other professionals wear blinders, focusing 
narrowly on maximizing quantity and speed and minimizing cost. Arrests, 
charges, and conviction statistics dominate budgeting, promotion decisions, 
and boasting. 
A series of reforms could combat this professionalized tunnel vision. 
Prosecutors’ offices could hire from a broader variety of backgrounds, 
including former defense lawyers and victims’ advocates. Their training 
could incorporate lay voices, psychological perspectives, and concern for 
victims. Salary and promotion decisions could look beyond quantity to 
reflect quality as well.50 
To do all of this, we need better metrics of success. Right now, an 
enormous amount rides on the crudest of measures: arrest, charge, and 
conviction statistics. Quantity is obvious and easy to measure; quality is all 
but absent. But police and prosecutors can take a page from businesses, 
which have found many ways to measure quality. Customer satisfaction 
50 See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 1007–14 (2009).
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surveys, for instance, provide rich qualitative information about the 
purchasing process as well as the product’s performance. More broadly, 
360-degree feedback aggregates information from an employee’s
supervisor, subordinates, peers, and customers. Police and prosecutors’
offices could expand these email or automated telephone surveys to include
victims, defendants, witnesses, judges, and opposing counsel. Supervisors
could use this information in training and performance evaluations, to ferret
out not only legal violations, negligence, and abuses of power, but even
rudeness and thoughtlessness. More comprehensive, real-time feedback
would greatly reduce professionals’ agency costs, forcing agents to be far
more responsive to all their principals’ interests and needs. Serving the
interests of victims, defendants, and the public would be not just a gauzy
ideal, but a concrete, measurable standard.51
These steps would improve the principal–agent problem at the level of 
line prosecutors, police, and judges. Improving accountability of head 
prosecutors and police chiefs is a tougher nut to crack. Prosecutorial 
elections are notoriously uncompetitive, driven by poor information, 
particularly scandals or a handful of high-profile trials.52 Better metrics of 
success could help somewhat. But, as David Schleicher and Elina Treyger 
explain, local prosecutorial elections are afflicted by apathy and low 
information, and that pathology is structural.53 Our best bet is probably to 
put less faith in periodic elections and more in ongoing community-
policing and community-prosecution meetings and partnerships. 
A second cluster of reforms should try to make punishment more 
productive, populist, and prosocial. Rather than spending years in idleness, 
able-bodied prisoners should be able to work, earning pay, making 
restitution, and developing marketable skills. One could even experiment 
with allowing able-bodied inmates without serious violent tendencies to 
enlist in the military, gradually earning the rank and privileges of ordinary 
enlisted soldiers and sailors. Inmates should make restitution to victims and 
support their own families, to the extent feasible. And this restitution 
should include not only monetary compensation and help undoing physical 
damage, but also expressions of remorse and apologies.54 
A particularly thorny issue is the extent to which punishment should 
incorporate shaming. On the one hand, shaming seems to involve the 
51 See id. at 1011–15. 
52 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 592–606 
(2009).  
53 David Schleicher & Elina Treyger, The Case Against the DA 24–26 (Sept. 30, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
54 See BIBAS, supra note 1, at 133–40. 
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community, allowing it to denounce the wrong and see justice done. On the 
other hand, shaming seems to unleash the worst passions of the mob, 
objectifying and scapegoating the wrongdoer. One might productively 
follow John Braithwaite in distinguishing reintegrative from disintegrative 
shaming, favoring temporary shame followed by forgiveness and 
reintegration.55 The goal is to make punishment more visible but also more 
local and more temporary, so it is more accountable but also more 
measured. 
Third, reformers should strive to improve public oversight by making 
American criminal justice more transparent. The public knows and sees 
little of what police, lawyers, and judges actually do each day, so it can do 
little to guide or rein them in. Investigative reporters could do much more 
to research and publicize aggregate statistics as well as typical cases, not 
just the sensational, atypical ones that grab headlines. Legislative oversight 
hearings should likewise attend to everyday cases, not just exceptional 
ones. Criminal court observers can assist, as could broadcasting court 
proceedings and filming police interactions with citizens.56  
But I am skeptical about using new media as a substitute for day-to-
day democratic oversight and engagement. All too often, electronic media 
elicit not reasoned deliberation but rather mob passions. It is simply hard, if 
not impossible, to recreate bygone eras when everyone in a small town 
knew everything about the criminal trial that was in their midst and 
consumed all their attention. There is a huge difference between knowing 
about individual cases at the retail level and hearing abstract statistics about 
wholesale criminal justice patterns. By itself, transparency risks promoting 
the latter without the former. 
Even so, some oversight is better than none at all. Prosecutors, 
currently accountable to almost no one in practice, will behave differently 
if they have some awareness of being watched. Police ordinarily behave 
differently when they know they are being filmed.57 The agency costs are 
so large, and so unchecked, that more transparency cannot hurt.  
55 Id. at 141; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54–107 (1989). 
56 Bibas, supra note 37, at 955–59; see Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-
Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2177–78 (2014) (finding a “right to a public criminal 
adjudication” and explaining “the constitutional importance of the audience in the nontrial courtroom”); 
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 391 (2016) (“This Article explores the 
phenomenon of organized copwatching—groups of local residents who wear uniforms, carry visible 
recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and film police-citizen interactions in an effort to hold police 
departments accountable to the populations they police.”).  
57 See LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM 5–7 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C8L-
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Fourth, reforms should strive to create more opportunities for the 
public to participate in criminal justice. This is most feasible at the lowest 
level of government, the neighborhood or police precinct: community-
policing and community-prosecution meetings can explain priorities and 
promote cooperation with neighborhood residents, while reciprocally 
soliciting and listening to residents’ priorities.58 
There are also ways to institutionalize participation within criminal 
justice institutions. Citizen volunteers could rotate through police 
departments and prosecutors’ offices, consulting on enforcement priorities. 
Revived grand juries, or plea juries, could play more meaningful roles in 
the most serious criminal cases. These juries could check prosecutorial 
charging and bargaining decisions, especially the (ab)use of mandatory 
minimum penalties.59 
Jury-like bodies could also play roles after conviction. Restorative 
sentencing juries could listen to victims’ and defendants’ stories and weigh 
reasons and appropriate penalties, instead of being bound by prosecutors’ 
unilateral charging decisions. And citizen input into clemency, including 
both pardon and commutation decisions, could revive a historic safety 
valve that has fallen into disuse in the hands of nervous bureaucrats.60 
CONCLUSION 
America’s plea bargaining assembly line is far removed from its 
colonial roots in a cathartic morality play. The modern amoral criminal 
justice bureaucracy is cut off from the wellsprings of democratic legitimacy 
and popular moral judgment. Rather than continuing to ignore or squelch 
democratic input, we would do better to welcome it back in, tempering 
efficient case processing with humane, equitable discretion. Insiders and 
outsiders, lawyers and laymen, should once again cooperate, balancing 
their perspectives as part of a broader morality play. 
VD7T] (reporting on studies showing that police officers who wore body cameras were involved in 
fewer use-of-force incidents and received fewer complaints). 
58 BIBAS, THE MACHINERY, supra note 1, at 146–47; Bibas, Transparency and Participation, supra 
note 37, at 959–60. 
59 BIBAS, THE MACHINERY, supra note 1, at 147–49; Bibas, Transparency and Participation, supra 
note 37, at 959–60. 
60 BIBAS, THE MACHINERY, supra note 1, at 156–64. 
